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Abstract
With the arrival of modern internet era, large public networks of various types have come to
existence to benefit the society as a whole and several research areas such as sociology, economics
and geography in particular. However, the societal and research benefits of these networks have
also given rise to potentially significant privacy issues in the sense that malicious entities may
violate the privacy of the users of such a network by analyzing the network and deliberately using
such privacy violations for deleterious purposes. Such considerations have given rise to a new
active research area that deals with the quantification of privacy of users in large networks and
the corresponding investigation of computational complexity issues of computing such quantified
privacy measures. In this paper, we formalize three such privacy measures for large networks and
provide non-trivial theoretical computational complexity results for computing these measures.
Our results show the first two measures can be computed efficiently, whereas the third measure
is provably hard to compute within a logarithmic approximation factor. Furthermore, we also
provide computational complexity results for the case when the privacy requirement of the
network is severely restricted, including an efficient logarithmic approximation.
1 Introduction
Social networks have certainly become an important center of attention in our modern information
society by transforming human relationships into a huge interchange of, very often, sensitive data.
There are many truly beneficial consequences when social network data are released for justified
∗Research partially supported by NSF grant IIS-1160995.
†This research was done while the author was visiting the University of Illinois at Chicago, USA, supported by
“Ministerio de Educacio´n, Cultura y Deporte”, Spain, under the “Jose´ Castillejo” program for young researchers
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mining and analytical purposes. For example, researchers in sociology, economics and geography,
as well as vendors in service-oriented systems and internet advertisers can certainly benefit and
improve their performances by a fair study of the social network data. But, such benefits are
definitely not free of cost as dishonest individuals or organizations may compromise the privacy of
its users while scrutinizing a public social network and may deliberately use such privacy violations
for harmful or other unfair commercial purposes. A common way to handle this kind of unwelcome
intrusion on the user’s privacy is to somehow anonymize the data by removing most potentially
identifying attributes. However, even after such anonymization, often it may still be possible to infer
many sensitive attributes of a social network that may be linked to its users, such as node degrees,
inter-node distances or network connectivity, and therefore further privacy-preserving methods need
to be investigated and analyzed. These additional privacy-preserving methods of social networks
are based on the concept of k-anonymity introduced for microdata in [16], aiming to ensure that
no record in a database can be re-identified with a probability higher than 1/k.
Crucial to modelling a social network anonymization process are of course the adversary’s
background knowledge of any object and the structural information about the network that is
available. For example, assuming the involved social network as a simple graph in which individuals
are represented by nodes and relationships between pairs of individuals are represented by edges,
the adversary’s background knowledge about a target (a node) could be the node degree [12], the
node neighborhood [23], etc. In such scenarios, it frequently suffices to develop attacks to re-identify
the individuals and their relationships. Such attacks are usually called passive (see [14] for more
information). Some examples of passive attacks and the corresponding privacy-preserving methods
for social networks can be found in references [12, 23, 24].
In contrast, Backstrom et al. introduced the concept of the so-called active attacks in [1].
Such attacks are mainly based on creating and inserting in a network some nodes (the “attacker
nodes”) under control by the adversary. These attacker nodes could be newly created accounts
with pseudonymous or spoofed identities (commonly called Sybil nodes), or existing legitimate
individuals in the network which are in the adversary’s proximity. The goal is then to establish
links with some other nodes in the network (or even links between other nodes) in order to create
some sort of “fingerprints” in the network that will be further released. Clearly, once the releasing
action has been achieved, the adversary could retrieve the fingerprints already introduced, and use
them to re-identify other nodes in the network. Backstrom et al. in [1] showed that O(
√
log n)
attacker nodes in a network could in fact seriously compromise the privacy of any arbitrary node.
In recent years, several research works have appeared that deal with decreasing the impact of these
active attacks (see, for instance, [20]). For other related publications on privacy-preserving methods
in social networks, see [15, 21, 23].
There are already many well-known active attack strategies for social networks in order to find
all possible vulnerabilities. However, somewhat surprisingly, not many prior research works have
addressed the goal of measuring how resistant is a given social network against these kinds of active
attacks to the privacy. To this effect, very recently a novel privacy measure for social networks was
introduced in [18]. The privacy measure proposed there was called the (k, ℓ)-anonymity, where k
is a number indicating a privacy threshold and ℓ is the maximum number of attacker nodes that
can be inserted into the network; ℓ may be estimated through some statistical methods1. Trujillo-
Rasua and Yero in [18] showed that graphs satisfying (k, ℓ)-anonymity can prevent adversaries who
control at most ℓ nodes in the network from re-identifying individuals with probability higher than
1/k. This privacy measure relies on a graph parameter called the k-metric anti-dimension.
1Note that other different privacy notions with the same name also exists, e.g., Feder and Nabar in [6] investigated
(k, ℓ)-anonymity where ℓ represented the number of common neighbors of two nodes.
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Consider a simple connected unweighted graph G = (V,E) and let distu,v be the length (number
of edges) of a shortest path between two nodes u, v ∈ V . For an ordered sequence S = u1, . . . , ut
of nodes of G and a node v ∈ V , the vector dv,−S = (distv,u1 , . . . ,distv,ut) is called the metric
representation of v with respect to S. Based on the above definition, a set S ⊂ V of nodes is called
a k-anti-resolving set for G if k is the largest positive integer such that for every node v ∈ V \S there
exist at least k− 1 different nodes v1, . . . , vk−1 ∈ V \ S such that dv,−S = dv1,−S = · · · = dvk−1,−S ,
i.e., v and v1, . . . , vk−1 have the same metric representation with respect to S. The k-metric anti-
dimension of G, denoted by adimk(G), is then the minimum cardinality of any k-anti-resolving set
in G. Note that k-anti-resolving sets may not exist in a graph for every k.
The connection between (k, ℓ)-anonymity privacy measure and the k-metric anti-dimension can
be understood in the following way. Suppose that an adversary takes control of a set of nodes
S of the graph (i.e., S plays the role of attacker nodes), and the background knowledge of such
an adversary regarding a target node v is the metric representation of the node v with respect
to S. The (k, ℓ)-anonymity privacy measure is then a privacy metric that naturally evolves from
the adversary’s background knowledge. Intuitively, if S (the attacker nodes of an adversary) is
a k-anti-resolving set then the adversary cannot uniquely re-identify other nodes in the network
(based on the metric representation) from these attacker nodes with a probability higher than 1/k
(based on uniform sampling of other nodes), and if the k-metric anti-dimension of the graph is ℓ
then the adversary must use at least ℓ attacker nodes to get the probability of privacy violation
down to 1/k.
1.1 Other Privacy Concepts and Measures
There is a rich literature on theoretical investigations of privacy measures and privacy preserving
computational models in several other application areas such as multi-party communications, dis-
tributed computing and game-theoretic settings (e.g., see [2, 3, 8, 11, 22]). However, none of these
settings apply directly to our application scenario of active attack model for social networks. The
differential privacy model, introduced by Dwork [5] in the context of privacy preservation in sta-
tistical databases against malicious database queries, works by computing the correct answer to
a query and adding a noise drawn from a specific distribution, and is quite different from the
anonymization approach studied in this paper.
1.2 Organization of the Paper
It is obviously desirable to know how secure a given social network is against active attacks. This ne-
cessitates the study of computational complexity issues for computing (k, ℓ)-anonymity. Currently
known results only include some heuristic algorithms with no provable guarantee on performances
such as in [18], or algorithms for very special cases. In fact, it is not even known if any version of
the related computational problems is NP-hard. To this effect, we formalize three computational
problems related to measuring the (k, ℓ)-anonymity of graphs and present non-trivial computational
complexity results for these problems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
⊲ In Section 2 we review some basic terminologies and notations and then present the three
computational problems that we consider in this paper. For the benefit of the reader, we also
briefly review some standard algorithmic complexity concepts and results that will be used
later.
⊲ In Section 3, we state the results in this paper mathematically precisely along with some
informal remarks. We group our results based on the problem definitions and the expected
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size of the attacker nodes.
⊲ Sections 4–6 are devoted to the proofs of the results stated in Section 3.
⊲ We finally conclude in Section 7 with some possible future research directions.
2 Basic Terminologies, Notations and Problem Definitions
In this section, we first describe the terminologies and notations required to describe our compu-
tational problems, and subsequently describe several versions of the problems we consider.
2.1 Basic Terminologies and Notations
v5v4v3v2v1
distvi,vj values
n = 5
G = (V,E)
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5
v1 0 1 3 2 3
v2 1 0 2 1 2
v3 3 2 0 1 1
v4 2 1 1 0 1
v5 3 2 1 1 0
Figure 1: An example to illustrate the notations in Section 2.1.
Let G = (V,E) be our undirected unweighted input graph over n nodes v1, v2, . . . , vn. We use
distvi,vj to denote the distance (number of edges in a shortest path) between nodes vi and vj . For
illustrating various notations, we use the example in Fig. 1.
◮ dvi = (distvi,v1 ,distvi,v2 , . . . ,distvi,vn). For example, dv2 = (1, 0, 2, 1, 2).
◮ diam(G) = max
vi,vj∈V
{
distvi,vj
}
is the diameter (length of a longest shortest path) of the graph
G = (V,E). For example, diam(G) = 3.
◮ Nbr (vℓ) = { vj | {vℓ, vj} ∈ E } is the (open) neighborhood of node vℓ in G = (V,E). For example,
Nbr (v2) = {v1, v4}.
◮ For a subset of nodes V ′ ⊂ V and any vi ∈ V \ V ′, dvi,−V ′ denotes the metric representation of
vi with respect to V
′, i.e., the vector of |V ′| elements obtained from dvi by deleting distvi,vj for
every vj ∈ V \ V ′. For example, dv2,−{v1,v3} = (1, 2).
◮ DV ′′,−V ′ =
{
dvi,−V ′ | vi ∈ V ′′
}
for any V ′′ ⊆ V \ V ′. For example, if V ′′ = {v2, v4} then
DV ′′,−{v1,v3} =
{
(1, 2), (2, 1)
}
.
◮ Π = {V1, V2, . . . , Vk} is a partition of V ′ ⊆ V if and only if ∪kt=1Vt = V ′ and Vi∩Vj = ∅ for i 6= j.
⊲ Partition Π′ = {V1, V2, . . . , Vℓ} is called a refinement2 of partition Π, denoted by Π′ ≺r Π,
provided ∪ℓt=1Vt ⊂ ∪kt=1Vt and Π′ can be obtained from Π in the following manner:
2Our definition is slightly different from the standard definition of refinement since we have ∪ℓt=1Vt ⊂ ∪
k
t=1Vt.
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⊲ For every node vi ∈
(∪kt=1Vt) \ (∪ℓt=1Vt), remove vi from the set containing it in Π.
⊲ Optionally, for every set Vℓ in Π, replace Vℓ by a partition of Vℓ.
⊲ Remove empty sets, if any.
For example, if Π =
{
{v1, v2} , {v3, v4, v5}
}
and Π′ =
{
{v1, v2} , {v3} , {v4}
}
then Π′ ≺r Π.
◮ The equality relation over a set of vectors, all of same length, obviously defines an equivalence
relation. The following notations are used for such an equivalence relation over the set of vectors
DV \V ′,−V ′ for some ∅ ⊂ V ′ ⊂ V .
⊲ The set of equivalence classes, which forms a partition of DV \V ′,−V ′ , is denoted by Π=V \V ′,−V ′ .
For example,
Π={v1,v2,v3},−{v4,v5} =
{{
(2, 3)
}
,
{
(1, 2)
}
,
{
(1, 1)
}}
.
⊲ Abusing terminologies slightly, two nodes vi, vj ∈ V \ V ′ will be said to belong to the same
equivalence class if dvi,−V ′ and dvj ,−V ′ belong to the same equivalence class in Π
=
V \V ′,−V ′ ,
and thus Π=V \V ′,−V ′ also defines a partition into equivalence classes of V \ V ′. For example,
Π={v1,v2,v3},−{v4,v5} will also denote
{{
v1
}
,
{
v2
}
,
{
v3
}}
.
⊲ The measure of the equivalence relation is defined as µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) def= min
Y∈Π=
V \V ′,−V ′
{
| Y |
}
.
Thus, if a set S is a k-anti-resolving set then DV \S,−S defines a partition into equivalence
classes whose measure is exactly k. For example, µ
(D{v1,v2,v3},−{v4,v5}) = 1 and {v4, v5} is a
1-anti-resolving set.
2.2 Problem Definitions
It is obviously desirable to know how secure a given social network is against active attacks. This
necessitates the study of computational complexity issues for computing (k, ℓ)-anonymity. To this
effect, we formalize three computational problems related to measuring the (k, ℓ)-anonymity of
graphs For all the problem versions, let G = (V,E) be the (connected undirected unweighted)
input graph representing the social network under study.
Problem 1 (metric anti-dimension or Adim)) Given G, find a subset of nodes V ′ that maxi-
mizes µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′).
Notation related to Problem 1 kopt = max
∅⊂V ′⊂V
{
µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) }.
Problem 1 simply finds a k-anti-resolving set for the largest possible k. Intuitively, it sets an
absolute bound on the privacy violation probability of an adversary assuming that the adversary
can use any number of attacker nodes. In practice, however, the number of attacker nodes employed
by the adversary may be limited, which leads us to the second problem formulation stated below.
Problem 2 (k≥-metric anti-dimension or Adim≥k) Given G and a positive integer k, find a
subset of nodes V ′ of minimum cardinality such that µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) ≥ k, if such a V ′ exists.
Notation and assumption related to Problem 2 L≥kopt =
∣∣∣V ≥kopt ∣∣∣ = min{ |V ′| ∣∣∣ µ (DV \V ′,−V ′) ≥
k
}
for some ∅ ⊂ V ≥kopt ⊂ V . If µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) ≥ k for no V ′ then we set L≥kopt =∞ and V ≥kopt = ∅.
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Problem 2 finds a k-anti-resolving set for largest k while simultaneously minimizing the number
of attacker nodes.
The remaining third version of our problem formulation relates to a trade-off between privacy
violation probability and the corresponding minimum number of attacker nodes needed to achieve
such a violation. To understand this motivation, suppose that G has a k-metric anti-dimension
of ℓ, a k′-metric anti-dimension of ℓ′, k′ > k and ℓ′ < ℓ. Then, this provides a trade-off between
privacy and number of attacker nodes, namely we may allow a smaller privacy violation probability
1/k′ but the network can tolerate adversarial control of a fewer number ℓ′ of nodes or we may allow
a larger privacy violation probability 1/k but the network can tolerate adversarial control of a larger
number ℓ of nodes. Such a trade-off may be crucial for a network administrator in administering
privacy of a network or for an individual in its decision to join a network. Clearly, this necessitates
solving a problem of the following type.
Problem 3 (k=-metric antidimension or Adim=k) Given G and a positive integer k, find a
subset of nodes V ′ of minimum cardinality such that µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) = k, if such a V ′ exists.
Notation and assumption related to Problem 3 L=kopt =
∣∣V =kopt ∣∣ = min{ |V ′| ∣∣∣ µ (DV \V ′,−V ′) =
k
}
for some ∅ ⊂ V =kopt ⊂ V . If µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) = k for no V ′ then we set L=kopt =∞ and V =kopt = ∅
2.3 Standard Algorithmic Complexity Concepts and Results
For the benefit of the reader, we summarize the following concepts and results from the computa-
tional complexity theory domain. We assume that the reader is familiar with standard O, Ω, o and
ω notations used in asymptotic analysis of algorithms (e.g., see [4]).
An algorithm A for a minimization (resp., maximization) problem is said to have an approxi-
mation ratio of ε (or is simply an ε-approximation) [19] provided A runs in polynomial time in the
size of its input and produces a solution with an objective value no larger than ε times (resp., no
smaller than 1/ε times) the value of the optimum. DTIME
(
nlog logn
)
refers to the class of problem
that can be solved by a deterministic algorithm running in (nlog logn) time when n is the size of the
input instance; it is widely believed that NP 6⊂DTIME(nlog logn).
The minimum set-cover problem (Sc) is a well-known combinatorial problem that is defined as
follows [4, 9]. Our input is an universe U = {a1, a2, . . . , an} of n elements, and a collection of m
sets S1, S2, . . . , Sm ⊆ U over this universe with ∪mj=1Sj = U . A valid solution of Sc is a subset of
indices I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that every element in U is “covered” by a set whose index is in I,
i.e., ∀ aj ∈ U ∃ i ∈ I : aj ∈ Si. The objective of Sc is to minimize the number |I| of selected sets.
We use the notation optSc to denote the size (number of sets) in an optimal solution of an instance
of Sc. On the inapproximability side, Sc is NP-hard [9] and, assuming NP 6⊆DTIME(nlog logn),
Sc does not admit a (1− ε) lnn-approximation for any constant 0 < ε < 1 [7]. On the algorithmic
side, Sc admits a (1 + lnn)-approximation using a simple greedy algorithm [10] that can be easily
implemented to run in O
(∑m
i=1 |Si|
)
time [4].
3 Our Results
In this section we provide precise statements of our results, leaving their proofs in Sections 4–6.
6
3.1 Polynomial Time Solvability of Adim and Adim≥k
Theorem 1
(a) Both Adim and Adim≥k can be solved in O
(
n4
)
time.
(b) Both Adim and Adim≥k can also be solved in O
(
n4 logn
k
)
time “with high probability” (i.e.,
with a probability of at least 1− n−c for some constant c > 0).
Remark 1 The randomized algorithm in Theorem 1(b) runs faster that the deterministic algorithm
in Theorem 1(a) provided k = ω(log n).
3.2 Computational Complexity of Adim=k
3.2.1 The Case of Arbitrary k
Theorem 2
(a) Adim=k is NP-complete for any integer k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ nε where 0 ≤ ε < 12 is any
arbitrary constant, even if the diameter of the input graph is 2.
(b) Assuming NP 6⊆ DTIME (nlog logn), there exists a universal constant δ > 0 such that Adim=k
does not admit a
(
1
δ lnn
)
-approximation for any integer k in the range 1 ≤ k ≤ nε where 0 ≤ ε < 12
is any arbitrary constant, even if the diameter of the input graph is 2.
(c) If k = n− c for some constant c then L=kopt = c if a solution exists and Adim=k can be solved in
polynomial time.
Remark 2
(a) For k = 1, the inapproximability ratio in Theorem 2(a) is asymptotically optimal up to a
constant factor because of the (1 + ln(n− 1))-approximation of Adim=1 in Theorem 3(a).
(b) The result in Theorem 2(b) provides a much stronger inapproximability result compared to
that in Theorem 2(a) at the expense of a slightly weaker complexity-theoretic assumption (i.e.,
NP 6⊆ DTIME (nlog logn) vs. P 6= NP).
3.2.2 The Case of k = 1
Note that even when k = 1 Adim=k is NP-hard and even hard to approximate within a logarithmic
factor due to Theorem 2. We show the following algorithmic results for Adim=k when k = 1.
Theorem 3
(a) Adim=1 admits a (1 + ln(n− 1) )-approximation in O
(
n3
)
time.
(b) If G has at least one node of degree 1 then L=1opt = 1 and thus Adim=1 can be solved in O
(
n3
)
time.
(c) If G does not contain a cycle of 4 edges then L=1opt ≤ 2 and thus Adim=1 can be solved in O
(
n3
)
time.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
(a) We first consider the claim for Adim≥k. We begin by proving some structural properties of
valid solutions for Adim≥k.
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Proposition 1 Consider two subsets of nodes ∅ ⊂ V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ V . Let vi, vj ∈ V2 be two nodes such
that they do not belong to the same equivalence class in Π=V \V1,−V1 . Then vi and vj do not belong
to the same equivalence class in Π=V \V2,−V2 also.
Proof. Since vi and vj are not in the same equivalence class in Π
=
V \V1,−V1
, we have dvi,−V1 6= dvj ,−V1
which in turn implies (since V1 ⊂ V2) dvi,−V2 6= dvj ,−V2 which implies vi and vj are not in the same
equivalence class in Π=V \V2,−V2 . ❑
Corollary 4 Proposition 1 implies Π=V \V2,−V2 ≺r Π=V \V1,−V1.
Note that Π=V \V2,−V2 ≺r Π=V \V1,−V1 in Corollary 4 does not necessarily imply that µ
(DV \V2,−V2) ≤
µ
(DV \V1,−V1). The following proposition gives some condition for this to happen.
Proposition 2 Consider two subsets of nodes ∅ ⊂ V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ V , and let S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ ⊆ V \ V1
be the only ℓ > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes) in Π=V \V1,−V1 such that |S1| = |S2| = · · · =
|Sℓ| = µ
(DV \V1,−V1). Then,
⊲ ∪ℓt=1St 6⊆ V2 \ V1 implies µ
(DV \V2,−V2) ≤ µ (DV \V1,−V1), and
⊲ if ∅ ⊂ V2 ∩ Sj ⊂ Sj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} then µ
(DV \V2,−V2) < µ (DV \V1,−V1).
Proof. Since V2 ∩ Sj ⊂ Sj, there exists a node vp such that vp ∈ Sj and vp /∈ V2. Similarly,
since ∅ ⊂ V2 ∩ Sj , there exists a node vq such that vq ∈ Sj and vq ∈ V2. By Corollary 4,
Π=V \V2,−V2 ≺r Π=V \V1,−V1 and thus the following implications hold:
• If ∪ℓt=1Vt 6⊆ V2 \ V1 then Π=V \V2,−V2 contains an equivalence class (subset of nodes) Sj′ ⊆ Sj
such that vi ∈ Sj′. This implies µ
(DV \V2,−V2) ≤ ∣∣Sj′∣∣ ≤ |Sj | = µ (DV \V1,−V1).
• If there exists a Sj such that ∅ ⊂ V2 ∩ Sj ⊂ Sj then Π=V \V2,−V2 contains an equivalence class
∅ ⊂ Sj′ ⊂ Sj with vp ∈ St′ . This implies µ
(DV \V2,−V2) ≤ ∣∣Sj′∣∣ < |Sj| = µ (DV \V1,−V1).
❑
Based on the above structural properties, we design Algorithm I for Adim≥k as shown below.
Algorithm I: O
(
n4
)
time deterministic algorithm for Adim≥k.
1. Compute di for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in O
(
n3
)
time using Floyd-Warshall algorithm [4, p. 629]
2. L̂≥kopt ←∞ ; V̂ ≥kopt ← ∅
3. for each vi ∈ V do (∗ we guess vi to belong to V ≥kopt ∗)
3.1 V ′ = {vi} ; done← FALSE
3.2 while
(
(V \ V ′ 6= ∅) AND (NOT done) ) do
3.2.1 compute µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.2 if
( (
µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) ≥ k ) and ( |V ′| < L̂≥kopt ))
3.2.3 then L̂≥kopt ← |V ′| ; V̂ ≥kopt ← V ′ ; done← TRUE
3.2.4 else let V1, V2, . . . , Vℓ be the only ℓ > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes)
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in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ such that |V1| = |V2| = · · · = |Vℓ| = µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.5 V ′ ← V ′ ∪ (∪ℓt=1Vt)
4. return L̂≥kopt and V̂
≥k
opt as our solution
Lemma 5 (Proof of correctness) Algorithm I returns an optimal solution for Adim≥k.
Proof. Assume that V ≥kopt 6= ∅ since otherwise obviously our returned solution is correct. Fix any
optimal solution (subset of nodes) V ≥kopt of measure µ
(
D
V \V ≥kopt ,−V
≥k
opt
)
≥ k and select any arbitrary
node vℓ ∈ V ≥kopt . Consider the iteration of the for loop in Step 3 when vi is equal to vℓ. We now
analyze the run of this particular iteration.
Let {vℓ} = V1 ⊂ V2 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Vκ be the κ subsets of nodes that were assigned to V ′ in successive
iterations of the while loop in Step 3.2. We have the following cases to consider.
Case 1: V ≥kopt = Vt for some t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}. Then, our solution is a set V̂ ≥kopt such that
µ
(
D
V \
̂
V ≥kopt ,−
̂
V ≥kopt
)
≥ k and L̂≥kopt ≤ L≥kopt.
Case 2: V ≥kopt 6= Vt for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ}. Since V1 = {vℓ} ⊂ V ≥kopt and Vt 6= V ≥kopt for any t ∈
{1, 2, . . . , κ}, only one of the following cases is possible:
Case 2.1: there exists r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ− 1} such that Vr ⊂ V ≥kopt but Vr+1 6⊆ V ≥kopt . Let
Vr,1, Vr,2, . . . , Vr,p ⊆ V \ Vr be all the p > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes) in
Π=V \Vr ,−Vr such that |Vr,1| = |Vr,2| = · · · = |Vr,p| = µ
(DV \Vr ,−Vr). Now we note the
following:
• By Step 3.2.5, Vr+1 = Vr ∪ Vr,1 ∪ Vr,2 ∪ · · · ∪ Vr,p.
• Thus, Vr ⊂ V ≥kopt and Vr+1 6⊆ V ≥kopt implies Vr,1∪Vr,2∪ · · · ∪Vr,p 6⊆ V ≥kopt , and therefore
there exists an index 1 ≤ s ≤ p such that Z = Vr,s \ V ≥kopt 6= ∅. Let Z ′ = Vr,s \ Z
(Z ′ could be empty). Then, for some ∅ ⊂ Z ′′ ⊆ Z, Z ′′ is an equivalence class in
Π=V \(Vr∪Z′),−(Vr∪Z′) implying
µ
(DV \(Vr∪Z′),−(Vr∪Z′)) ≤ ∣∣Z ′′∣∣ ≤ |Z| (1)
Since Vr ∪ Z ′ ⊆ V ≥kopt , we have
Π=
V \V ≥kopt ,−V
≥k
opt
≺r Π=V \(Vr∪Z′),−(Vr∪Z′)
(in Corollary 4, set V2 = V
≥k
opt and V1 = Vr ∪ Z
′)
⇒ k≤µ
(
D
V \V ≥kopt ,−V
≥k
opt
)
≤ µ (DV \(Vr∪Z′),−(Vr∪Z′)) ≤
by (1)
|Z| ≤ |Vr,s| = µ
(DV \Vr ,−Vr)
Thus, µ
(DV \Vr ,−Vr) ≥ k and |Vr| < ∣∣∣V ≥kopt ∣∣∣ = L≥kopt, contradicting the optimality of L≥kopt.
Case 2.2: Vκ ⊂ V ≥kopt . If done was set to TRUE at the last iteration of the while loop, then
µ
(DV \Vκ,−Vκ) ≥ k and |Vκ| < ∣∣∣V ≥kopt ∣∣∣ = L≥kopt, contradicting the optimality of L≥kopt. Thus,
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done must have remained FALSE after the last iteration of the while loop, which implies
µ
(DV \Vκ,−Vκ) < k. Let Vκ,1, Vκ,2, . . . , Vκ,p ⊆ V \ Vκ be all the p > 0 equivalence classes
(subsets of nodes) in Π=V \Vκ,−Vκ such that |Vκ,1| = |Vκ,2| = · · · = |Vκ,p| = µ
(DV \Vκ,−Vκ).
Since Vκ ⊂ Vopt, we have
Π=V \Vopt,−Vopt ≺r Π=V \Vκ,−Vκ
(in Corollary 4, set V2 = Vopt and V1 = Vκ)
⇒ k≤µ (DV \Vopt,−Vopt) ≤ µ (DV \Vκ,−Vκ) ≤
by (1)
|Z| ≤ |Vκ,p| = µ
(DV \Vκ,−Vκ)
Thus, µ
(DV \Vκ,−Vκ) ≥ k contradicting our assumption of µ (DV \Vκ,−Vκ) < k.
❑
Lemma 6 (Proof of time complexity) Algorithm I runs in O
(
n4
)
time.
Proof. There are n choices for the for loop in Step 3. For each such choice, we analyze the
execution of the while loop in Step 3.2. The running time in each iteration of the while loop is
dominated by the time taken to compute Π=
V \(V ′∪ (∪ℓt=1Vt) ),−V ′∪ (∪ℓt=1Vt)
from Π=V \V ′,−V ′ . Suppose
that ∪ℓt=1Vt =
{
vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vip
}
. By Corollary 4,
Π=
V \(V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2 ,...,vip−1,vip}),−V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2 ,...,vip−1,vip} ≺r Π
=
V \(V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2 ,...,vip−1}),−V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2 ,...,vip−1}
≺r . . . ≺r Π=V \(V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2}),−V ′∪{vi1 ,vi2} ≺r Π
=
V \(V ′∪{vi1}),−V ′∪{vi1} ≺r Π
=
V \V ′,−V ′
Thus, it follows that the total time to execute all iterations of the while loop for a specific choice
of vi in Step 3 is of the order of n times the time taken to solve a problem of the following kind:
for a subset of nodes ∅ ⊂ V1 ⊂ V , given Π=V \V1,−V1 and a node vj ∈ V \ V1, compute
Π=V \(V1∪{vj}),−(V1∪{vj}).
Since Π=V \(V1∪{vj}),−(V1∪{vj}) is a refinement of Π
=
V \V1,−V1
by Corollary 4, we can use the following
simple strategy. For every set S ∈ Π=V \V ′,−V ′ , we split S \ {vj} = {vi1 , vi2 , . . . , vis} into two or
more parts, if needed, by doing a bucket-sort (with n bins) in O(n |S|) time on the sequence
of values distvi1 ,vj ,distvi2 ,vj , . . . ,distvis ,vj ,. The total time taken for all sets in Π
=
V \V ′,−V ′ is thus∑
S∈Π=
V \V ′,−V ′
O (n |S|) = O (n2). ❑
This completes the proof for Adim≥k. Now we consider the claim for Adim. Obviously, Adim
can be solved in O
(
n5
)
time by solving Adim≥k for k = n−1, n−2, . . . , 1 in this order and selecting
the largest k as kopt for which L
≥k
opt <∞. However, we can modify the steps of Algorithm I directly
to solve Adim in O
(
n4
)
time, as shown in Algorithm II.
Algorithm II: O
(
n4
)
time deterministic algorithm for Adim
(changes from Algorithm-I are shown enclosed in )
1. Compute di for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in O
(
n3
)
time using Floyd-Warshall algorithm [4, p. 629]
2. V̂ ≥kopt ← ∅ ; k̂opt ← 0
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3. for each vi ∈ V do (∗ we guess vi to belong to V ≥kopt ∗)
3.1 V ′ = {vi}
3.2 while
(
V \ V ′ 6= ∅) do
3.2.1 compute µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.2 if
(
µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) > k̂opt )
3.2.3 then k̂opt ← µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′) ; V̂ ≥kopt ← V ′
3.2.4 else let V1, V2, . . . , Vℓ be the only ℓ > 0 equivalence classes (subsets of nodes)
in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ such that |V1| = |V2| = · · · = |Vℓ| = µ
(DV \V ′,−V ′)
3.2.5 V ′ ← V ′ ∪ (∪ℓt=1Vt)
4. return k̂opt and V̂
≥k
opt as our solution
The proof of correctness is very similar (and, in fact simpler due to elimination of some cases)
to that of Adim≥k.
(b) Our solution is the obvious randomization of Algorithm II (for Adim≥k) or Algorithm-II (for
Adim) as shown below.
Algorithm III (resp. Algorithm-IV): O
(
n4 logn
k
)
time randomized algorithm for Adim≥k (resp. Adim)
1. Compute di for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in O
(
n3
)
time using Floyd-Warshall algorithm
2. L̂≥kopt ←∞ ; V̂ ≥kopt ← ∅ (for Adim≥k)
or
V̂ ≥kopt ← ∅ ; k̂opt ← 0 (for Adim)
3. repeat
⌈
2n lnn
k
⌉
times
3.1 select a node vi uniformly at random from the n nodes
3.2 execute Step 3.1 and Step 3.2 (and its sub-steps) of Algorithm I (for Adim≥k)
or
execute Step 3.1 and Step 3.2 (and its sub-steps) of Algorithm II (for Adim)
4. return the best of all solutions found in Step 3
The success probability p is given by
p = Pr
[
vi ∈ V ≥kopt in at least one of the
⌈
2n lnn
k
⌉
iterations
]
= 1−Pr
[
vi /∈ V ≥kopt in each of the
⌈
2n lnn
k
⌉
iterations
]
≥ 1−
(
1− k
n
)⌈ 2n lnnk ⌉
> 1− 1
e2 lnn
= 1− 1
n2
5 Proof of Theorem 2
(a) Adim=k trivially belongs to NP for any k, thus we need to show that it is also NP-hard.
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The standard NP-complete minimum dominating set (Mds) problem for a graph is defined as
follows [9]. Our input is a connected undirected unweighted graph G = (V,E). A subset of nodes
V ′ ⊂ V is called a dominating set if and only if every node in V \ V ′ is adjacent to some node
in V ′. The objective of Mds is to find a dominating set of nodes of minimum cardinality. Let
ν(G) denote the cardinality of a minimum dominating set for a graph G. It is well-known that
the Mds and Sc problems have precisely the same approximability via approximation-preserving
reductions in both directions and, in particular, there exists a standard reduction from Sc to Mds
as follows. Given an instance U = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and S1, S2, . . . , Sm ⊆ U of Sc, we create the
following instance G1 = (V1, E1) of Mds. V1 has an element node vai for every element ai ∈ U and
a set node vSj for every set Sj with j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. There are two types of edges in E1. Every set
node vSj has an edge to every other set node vSℓ and the collection of these edges is called the set
of clique edges. Moreover, a set node vSj is connected to an element node vai if and only if ai ∈ Sj
and the collection of these edges is called the set of membership edges. A standard straightforward
argument shows that I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} is a solution of Sc if and only if the collection of set nodes
{ vSi | i ∈ I } is a solution of Mds on G1 and thus optSc = ν (G1).
For the purpose of our NP-hardness reduction, it would be more convenient to work with a
restricted version of Sc known as the exact cover by 3-sets (X3c) problem. Here we have exactly n
elements and exactly n sets where n is a multiple of three, every set contains exactly 3 elements and
every element occurs in exactly 3 sets. Obviously we need at least n3 sets to cover all the n elements.
Letting optX3c to denote the number of sets in an optimal solution of X3c, it is well-known that
problem of deciding whether optX3c =
n
3 is in fact NP-complete.
Let n1 =
−6k+
√
36k2+24(n−k)
4 be the real-valued solution of the quadratic equation n1
(
2k + 2n13
)
+
k = n. Note that since k ≤ nε for some constant ε < 12 , we have n1 = Θ(
√
n ), i.e., n and n1 are
“polynomially related”.
We assume without loss of generality that n1 is an even integer, and start with an instance of
X3c of n12 elements and transform it to an instance graph G1 = (V1, E1) having n1 nodes of Mds
via the reduction outlined before. Since n12 is polynomially related to n, such an instance of X3c
is NP-complete with respect to n being the input size. We reduce G1 to an instance G = (V,E) of
Adim=k in polynomial time as follows (see Fig. 2 for an illustration):
• We “clone” each element node vaj ∈ V1 to get 2k+ 2n13 copies, i.e., every node vaj is replaced by
2k+ 2n13 new nodes vaj ,1, vaj ,2, . . . , vaj ,2k+
2n1
3
,. We refer to these nodes as clones of the element
node vaj (or, sometimes simply as element-clone nodes). There are precisely n1
(
k + n13
)
such
nodes.
• We “clone” each set node vSj ∈ V1 to get 2k + 2n13 copies, i.e., every node vSj is replaced
by 2k + 2n13 new nodes vSj ,1, vSj ,2, . . . , vSj ,2k+
2n1
3
,. We refer to these nodes as clones of the
set node vSj (or, sometimes simply as set-clone nodes). There are precisely n1
(
k + n13
)
such
nodes.
• We add k new nodes u1, u2, . . . , uk. We refer to these nodes as clique nodes.
• We add an edge between every pair of clique nodes ui and uj . We refer to these edges as
clique edges. There are precisely
(k
2
)
such edges.
• We add an edge between every clique node and every non-clique node, i.e., we add every edge
in the set
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X3c
Mds
G1 = (V1, E1)
⇒
va1 va2 va3 va4 va5 va6
vS1 vS2 vS3 vS4 vS5 vS6
U = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6}
S1 = {a1, a2, a3} S2 = {a4, a5, a6}
S3 = {a1, a2, a5} S4 = {a3, a4, a6}
S5 = {a1, a5, a6} S6 = {a2, a3, a4}
n1
2
= 6
u1
part of
G = (V,E)
︷ ︸︸ ︷element-clones of va2 ︷ ︸︸ ︷element-clones of va3 ︷ ︸︸ ︷element-clones of va4
︸ ︷︷ ︸
set-clones of vS2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
set-clones of vS3
︸ ︷︷ ︸
set-clones of vS4
⇓
Adim=1
Figure 2: Illustration of the NP-hardness reduction in Theorem 2(a). Only a part of the graph G
is shown for visual clarity.
{{
ui, vaj ,ℓ
} | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n1
2
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2k + 2n1
3
}
⋃ {{
ui, vSj ,ℓ
} | 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ n1
2
, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2k + 2n1
3
}
We refer to these edges as the partition-fixing edges. There are precisely kn1
(
k + n13
)
such
edges.
• We add an edge between every pair of distinct element-clone nodes vaj ,ℓ and vaj′ ,ℓ′ . We refer
to these as the element-clone edges. There are precisely
(
2k+(2n1)/3
2
)
such edges.
• For every element ai and every set Sj such that ai /∈ Sj, we add the following
(
2k + 2n13
)2
edges: {
vSj ,ℓ, vai,p
}
for 1 ≤ ℓ, p ≤ 2k + 2n1
3
We refer to these edges as the non-member edges corresponding to the element node ai and
the set node Sj . There are precisely
3n1
2
(
2k + 2n13
)2
such edges.
Note that G has precisely n1
(
2k + 2n13
)
+ k = n nodes and thus our reduction is polynomial time
in n. Since any clique node is adjacent to every other node in G, it follows that diam(G) = 2. We
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now show the validity of our reduction by showing that
(⋆) ν (G1) =
n1
3
if and only if L=kopt ≤
n1
3
Proof of ν (G1) =
n1
3 ⇒ L=kopt ≤ n13
Consider an optimal solution V ′1 ⊂
{
vS1 , vS2 , . . . , vSn1
}
of Mds on G1 with ν (G1) = |V ′1 | = n13 .
We now construct a solution V ′ ⊂ V of Adim=k on G by setting V ′ =
{
vSj ,1 | vSj ∈ V ′1
}
. Note that
|V ′| = |V ′1 | = n13 . We claim that V ′ is a valid solution of Adim=k by showing that
(a) {u1, u2, . . . , uk} ∈ Π=V \V ′,−V ′ and
(b) any other equivalence class in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ has at least k nodes.
To prove (a), consider a clique node ui and any other non-clique node. Then, the following cases
apply:
• Suppose that the non-clique node is a element-clone node vaj ,ℓ ∈ V \ V ′ for some j and ℓ.
Since V ′1 is a solution of Mds on G1, there exists a set node vSp ∈ V ′1 such that
{
vSp , vaj
} ∈ E1
and consequently
{
vSp,1, vaj ,ℓ
}
/∈ E. This implies that there exists a node vSp,1 ∈ V ′ such
that 1 = distui,vaj,ℓ 6= distvSp,1,vaj,ℓ , and therefore vaj ,ℓ cannot be in the same equivalence
class with ui.
• Suppose that the non-clique node is a set-clone node vSj ,p ∈ V \ V ′. Pick any set-clone node
vSℓ,1 ∈ V ′. Then, 1 = distui,vSj,p 6= distvSj,p,vSℓ,1 , and therefore vSj ,p cannot be in the same
equivalence class with ui.
To prove (b), note the following:
• Since diam(G) = 2, distvSi,p,vSj,q = 2 for any two distinct set-clone nodes vSi,p and vSj ,q, and
thus all the set nodes in V \ V ′ belong together in the same equivalence class in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ .
There are at least n1
(
k + n13
) − n13 > k such nodes in V \ V ′. Thus, any equivalence class
that contains these set-clone nodes cannot have less than k nodes.
• Consider now an equivalence class in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ that contains a copy vai,j of the element node
vai for some i and j. Consider another copy vai,ℓ of the element node vai for some ℓ 6= j.
For any set node vSp,1 ∈ V ′, if ai /∈ Sp then distvSp,1,vai,j = distvSp,1,vai,ℓ = 1, whereas if
ai ∈ Sp then, since diam(G) = 2, it follows that distvSp,1,vai,j = distvSp,1,vai,ℓ = 2. Thus, any
equivalence class that contains at least one clone of an element node must contain all the
2k + 2n13 > k clones of that element node and thus such an equivalence class cannot have a
number of nodes that is less than k.
Proof of L=kopt ≤ n13 ⇒ ν (G1) = n13
Since we know that ν (G1) is always at least
n1
3 , it suffices to show that L
=k
opt ≤ n13 ⇒ ν (G1) ≤
n1
3 . Consider an optimal solution V
=k
opt ⊂ V with L=kopt ≤
∣∣V =kopt ∣∣ = n13 . Since V =kopt is a solution
of Adim=k on G, there exists a subset of nodes, say V̂ ⊂ V \ V =kopt , such that |V̂ | = k and
V̂ ∈ Π=
V \V =kopt ,−V
=k
opt
.
Proposition 3 V̂ does not contain any set-clone or element-clone nodes and thus V̂ = {u1, u2, . . . , uk}.
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Proof. Suppose that V̂ contains at least one element-clone node vai,j for some i and j. But, V \V =kopt
contains at least 2k+ 2n13 − n13 −1 > k other clones of the element node ai and all these clones must
belong together with vai,j in the same equivalence class. This implies |V̂ | ≥ 2k + 2n13 − n13 > k, a
contradiction.
Similarly, suppose that V̂ contains at least one set-clone node vSi,j for some i and j. But,
V \ V =kopt contains at least 2k+ 2n13 − n13 − 1 > k other clones of the set node Si and all these clones
must belong together with vSi,j in the same equivalence class. This implies |V̂ | ≥ 2k+ 2n13 − n13 > k,
a contradiction. ❑
Proposition 4 V =kopt does not contain two or more clones of the same set node.
Proof. Suppose that V =kopt contains two set-clone nodes vSj ,p and vSj ,q of the same set node vSj .
But, V \V =kopt contains at least 2k+ 2n13 − n13 −1 > k other clones of the element node ai and all these
clones must belong together in the same equivalence class S. If we remove vSj ,p from V
=k
opt then
vSj ,p gets added to this equivalence class. Thus, such a removal produced another valid solution
but with one node less than Lopt, contradicting the optimality of L
=k
opt. ❑
Proposition 5 V =kopt does not contain any element-clone node.
Proof. Suppose that V =kopt contains at least one element-clone node and thus at most
n1
3 − 1
set-clone nodes. Note that V \V =kopt contains at least 2k+ 2n13 − n13 clones of every element node ai.
Consider an element-clone node vai,p ∈ V \V =kopt and a clique node uj. Since V̂ = {u1, u2, . . . , uk} ∈
Π=
V \V =kopt ,−V
=k
opt
, there must be a node in V =kopt such that the distance of this node to uj is different
from the distance to vai,p. Such a node in V
=k
opt cannot be an element-clone node, say vaℓ,q since
distvai,p,vaℓ,q = distuj ,vaℓ,q = 1. Since there is an edge between every set-clone node and every clique
node, such a node must be a set-clone node, say vSr,s for some r and s, such that distvai,p,vSr,s = 2,
i.e., ai ∈ Sr. Since every set in X3c contains exactly 3 elements and 3 ×
(
n1
3 − 1
)
< n1, there
must then exist an element-clone node vai,p such that the distance of vai,p to any node in V
=k
opt is
exactly the same as the distance of uj to that node in V
=k
opt . This implies vai,p ∈ V̂ , contradicting
Proposition 3. ❑
By Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, V =kopt contains exactly one clone of a subset of set nodes.
Without loss of generality, assume that V =kopt =
{
vSj ,1 | j ∈ J, J ⊂
{
1, 2, . . . , n12
}}
and let V ′1 ={
vSj | vSj ,1 ∈ V =kopt
}
. Note that |V ′1 | =
∣∣V =kopt ∣∣. We are now ready to finish our proof by showing V ′1
is indeed a valid solution of Mds on G1. Suppose not, and let vai be an element-node that is not
adjacent to any node in V ′1 . Then,
∀ vSj ∈ V ′1 :
{
vai , vSj
}
/∈ E1 ⇒ ∀ vSj ,1 ∈ V =kopt :
{
vai,1, vSj ,1
} ∈ E
⇒ ∀ vSj ,1 ∈ V =kopt : distvai,1,vSj,1 = 1 ⇒ vai,1 ∈ V̂
which contradicts Proposition 3.
(b) The proof is similar to that of (a) but this time we start with a general version of Sc as
opposed to the restricted X3c version, and show that the reduction is approximation-preserving in
an appropriate sense. In the sequel, we use the standard notation poly(n) to denote a polynomial
nc of n (for some constant c > 0). We recall the following details of the inapproximability reduction
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of Feige in [7]. Given an instance formula φ of the standard Boolean satisfiability problem (Sat),
Feige reduces φ to an instance U , S1, S2, . . . , Sm of Sc (with m = poly(n)) in O(nlog logn) time such
that the following properties are satisfied for any constant 0 < ε < 1:
• For some Q > 0, either optSc =
n
Q or optSc >
(
n
Q
)
(1− ε) ln n.
• The reduction satisfies the following completeness and soundness properties:
(completeness) If φ is satisfiable then optSc =
n
Q .
(soundness) If φ is not satisfiable then optSc >
(
n
Q
)
(1− ε) ln n.
Since m = poly(n), by adding duplicate copies of a set, if necessary, we can ensure that m = nc−n
for some constant c ≥ 1. Our reduction from Sc to Mds to Adim=k is same as in (a) except that
some details are different, which we show here.
• We start with an instance of Sc as given by Feige in [7] with n1 elements and m = (n1)
c−n1 sets,
where n1 =
(
−k+
√
k2+2(n−k)
2
)1/c
is a real-valued solution of the equation (n1)
2c+k(n1)
c− n−k2 =
0. Note that since k ≤ nε for some constant ε < 12 , we have n1 = Θ
(
n1/(2 c)
)
, i.e., n and n1 are
polynomially related.
• We make 2(n1)
c+2k copies of each element node and each set node as opposed to 2k+ 2n13 copies
that we made in the proof of (a). Note that G has again precisely (n1)
c (2k + 2(n1)
c ) + k = n
nodes.
• Let δ > 0 be the constant given by δ = lnn(1−ε) lnn1 . Our claim (⋆) in the proof of (a) is now
modified to
(⋆)
(completeness) if ν (G1) =
n1
Q then L
=k
opt ≤ n1Q
(soundness) if ν (G1) >
(
n1
Q
)
(1− ε) ln n1 then L=kopt >
(
n1
Q
)
(1− ε) ln n1 =
(
n1
Q
)
1
δ lnn
• Our proof of the completeness claim follows the “Proof of ν (G1) =
n1
3 ⇒ L=kopt ≤ n13 ” in the
proof of (a) with the obvious replacement of n13 by
n1
Q .
• Note that our soundness claim is equivalent to its contra-positive
if L=kopt ≤
(
n1
Q
)
(1− ε) lnn1 then ν (G1) ≤
(
n1
Q
)
(1− ε) ln n1
and the proof of this contra-positive follows the “Proof of L=kopt ≤ n13 ⇒ ν (G1) = n13 ” in the
proof of (a). In the proof, the quantity 2k + 2n13 corresponding to the number of copies for each
set and element node needs to be replaced by 2(n1)
c + 2k; note that (2(n1)
c + 2k) − n1 ≫ k.
(c) Since k = n − c for some constant c, Π=
V \V =kopt ,−V
=k
opt
contains a single equivalence class V ′ ⊂ V
such that |V ′| = k. Thus, we can employ the straightforward exhaustive method of selecting every
possible subset V ′ of k nodes to be in Π=V \V ′,−V ′ and checking if the chosen subset of nodes provide
a valid solution. There are
(n
k
)
< nc such possible subsets and therefore the asymptotic running
time is O
(
nc + n3
)
which is polynomial in n. Note that for this case L=kopt = c if a solution exists.
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6 Proof of Theorem 3
(a) Note that trivially L=1opt ≤ n−1 and thus V =1opt 6= ∅. Our algorithm, shown as Algorithm V, uses
the greedy logarithmic approximation of Johnson [10] for Sc that selects, at each successive step,
a set that contains the maximum number of elements that are still not covered.
Algorithm V: O
(
n3
)
-time (1 + ln(n− 1) )-approximation algorithm for Adim=1.
1. Compute di for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n in O
(
n3
)
time using Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
2. L̂=1opt ←∞ ; V̂ =1opt ← ∅
3. for each node vi ∈ V do (∗ we guess the set {vi} to belong to Π=V \V =1opt ,−V =1opt ∗)
3.1 create the following instance of Sc containing n− 1 elements and n− 1 sets:
U = { avj | vj ∈ V \ {vi}},
Svj =
{
avj
} ∪ { avℓ |distvi,vj 6= distvℓ,vj} for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}
3.2 if ∪j∈{1,2,...,n}\{i}Svj = U then
3.2.1 run the greedy approximation algorithm [10] for this instance of Sc
giving a solution I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i}
3.2.2 V ′ = { vj | j ∈ I }
3.2.3 if
( |V ′| < L̂=1opt ) then L̂=1opt ← |V ′| ; V̂ =1opt ← V ′
4. return L̂=1opt and V̂
=1
opt as our solution
Lemma 7 (Proof of correctness) Algorithm V returns a valid solution for Adim=1.
Proof. Suppose that our algorithm returns an invalid solution in the iteration of the for loop
in Step 3 when vi is equal to vℓ for some vℓ ∈ V . We claim that this cannot be the case since
{vℓ} ∈ Π=V \V ′,−V ′ . Indeed, since I is a valid solution of the Sc instance, for every j /∈ {ℓ} ∪ I, the
following holds:
∃ t ∈ I : avj ∈ Svt ⇒ ∃ vt ∈ V ′ : distvℓ,vt 6= distvj ,vt
and thus vℓ cannot be together with any other node in any equivalence class in Π
=
V \V ′,−V ′ . ❑
Lemma 8 (Proof of approximation bound) Algorithm V solves Adim=1 with an approxima-
tion ratio of 1 + ln(n− 1).
Proof. Fix any optimal solution V =1opt . Since µ
(
DV \V =1opt ,−V =1opt
)
= 1, {vℓ} ∈ Π=V \V =1opt ,−V =1opt for
some vℓ ∈ V . Consider the iteration of the for loop in Step 3 when vi is equal to vℓ. We now
analyze the run of this particular iteration, and claim that the set-cover instance created during
this iteration satisfies optSc ≤
∣∣V =1opt ∣∣ = L=1opt. To see this, construct the following solution of the
set-cover instance from Vopt containing exactly Lopt sets:
vi ∈ V =1opt ≡ i ∈ I
To see that this is indeed a valid solution of the set-cover instance, consider any avj ∈ U =
{av1 , av2 , . . . , avn} \ {avℓ}. Then, the following cases apply showing that avj belongs to some set
selected in our solution of Sc:
17
• if j ∈ I then avj ∈ Svj and Svj is a selected set in the solution.
• if j /∈ I then vj ∈ V \ Vopt ⇒ ∃ vt ∈ Vopt : distvℓ,vt 6= distvj ,vt ⇒ ∃ t ∈ I : avj ∈ Svt .
Using the approximation bound of the algorithm of [10] it now follows that the quality of our
solution L̂=1opt satisfies
L̂
=1
opt =
∣∣∣V̂ =1opt ∣∣∣ = |I| < (1 + ln(n− 1) )optSc ≤ (1 + ln(n− 1) )L=1opt
❑
Lemma 9 (Proof of time complexity) Algorithm V runs in O
(
n3
)
time.
Proof. There are a total of n instances of set cover that we need to build in Step 3.1 and solve by
the greedy heuristic in Step 3.2.1. Building the set-cover instance can be trivially done in O
(
n2
)
time by comparing distvi,vj for all appropriate pairs of nodes vi and vj . Since the set-cover instance
in Step 3.1 has n − 1 sets each having no more than n − 1 elements, each implementation of the
greedy heuristic in Step 3.2.1 takes O
(
n2
)
time. ❑
(b) Let vi be the node of degree 1. Let vℓ be the unique node adjacent to vi (i.e., {vi, vℓ} ∈ E).
Consider the following solution of Adim=1: V
′ = {vi}. We claim that is a valid solution of Adim=1
by showing that {vℓ} ∈ Π=V \V ′,−V ′ . Consider any node vj ∈ V \ {vi, vℓ}, Then, 1 = distvℓ,vi 6=
distvj ,vi .
vi vjvℓ
Nbr (vi) \ {vℓ} Nbr (vj) \ {vℓ}
Nbr (vℓ) \ {vi, vj}
× ×
V ′
Figure 3: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 3(c). Edges marked by × cannot exist. No node in
Nbr (vℓ) \ {vi, vj} can have an edge to both vi and vj .
(c) Since G does not contain a 4-cycle, diam(G) ≥ 2. Thus, there exists two nodes vi, vj ∈ V such
that distvi,vj = 2. Let vℓ be a node at a distance of 1 from both vi and vj on a shortest path
between vi and vj (see Fig. 3). Consider the following solution of Adim=1: V
′ = {vi, vj}. Note that
vℓ ∈ V \ V ′. We claim that this is a valid solution of Adim=1 by showing that {vℓ} ∈ Π=V \V ′,−V ′
(i.e., no node vp ∈ V \ {vi, vj , vℓ} can belong together with vℓ in the same equivalence class of
Π=V \V ′,−V ′) in the following manner:
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• If vp ∈ Nbr (vi) \ {vℓ} then distvℓ,vj = 1 but distvp,vj 6= 1 since G has no 4-cycle (see the edges
marked × in Fig. 3).
• If vp ∈ Nbr (vj) \ {vℓ} then distvℓ,vi = 1 but distvp,vi 6= 1 since G has no 4-cycle (see the edges
marked × in Fig. 3).
• If vp ∈ Nbr (vℓ)\{vi, vj} then vp cannot be adjacent to both vi and vj since G does not contain
a 4-cycle. This implies that distvℓ,vi = distvℓ,vj = 1 but at least one of distvp,vi and distvp,vj
is not equal to 1.
• If vp is any node not covered by the above cases, then distvp,vi > 1 but distvℓ,vi = 1.
7 Concluding Remarks
Prior to our work, known results for these privacy measures only included some heuristic algorithms
with no provable guarantee on performances such as in [18], or algorithms for very special cases.
In fact, it was not even known if any version of these related computational problems is NP-hard.
Our work provides the first non-trivial computational complexity results for effective computation
of these measures. Theorem 1 shows that both Adim and Adim≥k are provably computationally
easier problems than Adim=k. In contrast, Theorem 2(a)–(b) and Theorem 3 show that Adim=k is
in general computationally hard but admits approximations or exact solution for specific choices of
k or graph topology. We believe that our results will stimulate further research on quantifying and
computing privacy measures for networks. In particular, our results raise the following interesting
research questions:
◮ We have only provided a logarithmic approximation algorithm for Adim=1. Is it possible to
design a non-trivial approximation algorithm for Adim=k for k > 1 ? We conjecture that a
O(log n)-approximation is possible for Adim=k for every fixed k.
◮ We have provided a logarithmic inapproximability result for Adim=k for every k roughly up
to
√
n. Can this approximability result be further improved when k is not a constant ?
We conjecture that the inapproximability factor can be further improved to Ω (nε) for some
constant 0 < ε < 1 when k is around
√
n.
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